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Regional policy and hydroelectric
resources
The case of a Swiss Mountain Canton 
Franco Romerio
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translation: Luc Gueriane, Durham, UK 
1 Ticino is  an Italian speaking Swiss canton situated in the South of the Alps.  An idea
marked its history from the end of the 19th century: valorising hydroelectric potential in
the canton’s interest. The stakes, that presented themselves differently in time, include
economic  development,  fiscal  perception,  electricity  supply  and  environmental
protection. 
2 In order to valorise hydroelectric potential, the canton firstly backed water concessions
to  private,  public  and  mixed  electricity  companies  rooted  in  Ticino  and  in  German
speaking cantons. Later, it opted for water cantonalisation, through the creation of its
own company, Azienda Elettrica Ticinese (AET). Cantonalisation was justified on the basis
that water represents a public property and electricity supply, a public service. A more
recent argument raises the usefulness of maintaining decision centres under the canton’s
control,  on  the  basis  that  electricity  companies  can  play  a  crucial  part  in  regional
economic development. 
3 Ticino’s economic policy was greatly influenced by the organisation of electricity markets
and the configuration of networks. Until recently, markets were structured according to a
monopolistic model. Access to networks was subject to owners consent. For the canton,
there was notably the problem of managing the electricity surpluses and deficits. The
passage from a monopolistic system to a competitive one, as well as the adoption of the
principle of third party access to networks, open interesting perspectives but introduce
new risk. 
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4 Electricity  caused  significant  political  conflicts  in  Ticino,  between  supporters  and
opponents  of  cantonalisation,  and  more  recently  of  the  opening  of  markets  to
competition. Intense controversies characterised discussions on the choice of goals, when
seeking to prioritise economic,  fiscal,  energy and environmental  objectives.  Relations
between the canton and extra-cantonal electricity companies also experienced frictions.
The same applied between the canton and towns and villages involved in hydroelectric
exploitation, to the extent that some united with extra-cantonal companies in an attempt
to block the canton’s plans. 
5 This article analyses the technico-economic factors that influenced electricity policy in
Ticino and highlights the room for manoeuvre that cantonal political authorities were
able  to  use.  Political  choices  were  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  the  following  criteria:
electricity supply security, environmental protection and socio-economic development of
the canton.  The objective is  to identify the critical  factors that should be taken into
consideration when defining regional policy on hydroelectric matters. 
6 The problem is extremely important to mountain regions of developed and developing
countries  looking  to  valorise  their  hydroelectric  potential  in  a  context  often
characterised by the opening of markets to competition and privatisations. The interest
of our study resides in the fact that it provides a long term perspective. Furthermore, the
geographic, economic and political particularities of Ticino allow us to clearly define the
area studied and highlight external relations. 
7 The sources used to carry out this study are represented by the reports of the federal and
cantonal government, the reports and minutes of the cantonal parliament, the studies
published by the public administration and the electricity sector from the end of the 19th
century  to  date.  Our  publications  provide  details  on  sources  and  references  used
(Romerio, 1985, 1994a). Bibliography on electricity in Switzerland is extremely vast. The
books cited as references represent an introduction to the subject (Beltz, 1996; Gugerli,
1996; Paquier, 1998; Romerio, 1994b, 2007). 
8 The article is organised in the following manner: first, we outline the institutional and
economic  frame  for  hydroelectric  exploitation.  Then,  we  evoke  socio-economic  and
environ-mental impacts. The main part of the paper is devoted to a historical analysis,
from the end of the 19th century to 2007. The analysis of the recent situation allows us to
consider future perspectives, before concluding with the critical factors of regional policy
in the hydroelectric domain. 
 
The institutional and economic framework facing the
end of monopolies 
Federalism and water concessions 
9 The federal hydropower act of the 22nd December 1916 is a framework law that preserves
the sovereignty of cantons and defines the water concession system. The cantonal act on
the use of water of the 17th May 1894, replaced by that of the 7th October 2002, rests on
the same concepts. Federalism and the concessions system characterise hydro-electric
exploitation in Switzerland. The concession determines the rights and obligations of the
electric company. In principle, it lasts for 80 years. Article 43 of the federal act states that
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"once granted, the right of use cannot be rescinded or restricted except for reasons of
public utility and upon indemnification". The concession thus creates vested rights. 
10 Concessions cannot be called into question by the opening of markets to competition.
This  represents  an  obstacle  for  the  dynamics  in  progress;  at  the  same  time  it  is  a
guarantee for the canton, notably in the case where the concessionary company would
have to change ownership. However, with developments in laws of competition, it is not
granted that in the future, public authorities attribute concessions as they did before. 
 
Monopoly and competition 
11 Until  recently,  the  electricity  market  structure  had  a  monopolistic  character.  Local
distribution companies and a private company controlled the market in their respective
areas  of  influence.  They  managed  low  and  medium tension  networks.  The  cantonal
market and its high tension networks were controlled by ATEL (a private company based
in the German part of Switzerland), before passing over to AET. The very high tension
interconnection between the canton and national and international markets depended on
ATEL, which assured network regulation for the entire canton. 
12 This  system  is  undergoing  profound  restructuring  with  the  opening  of  markets  to
competition and the adoption of third party access to the network. As it is not possible to
describe these reforms in this paper, it is useful to recall an element that allowed AET to
expand  its  sphere  of  activity:  the  handing  over  by  EGL,  which  had  a  profile  of  a
competitor to ATEL on the Swiss market, of a certain transport capacity on its national
and international interconnection. Access to the network and to extra-cantonal markets
is fundamental in the valorisation of the hydroelectric energy produced in the Alps. 
 
The impacts of hydroelectric exploitation 
On the regional economy 
13 The electricity sector represents an important economic activity for Ticino. Qualified jobs
have  been  created  in  both  technical  and  commercial  domains.  The  availability  of
electricity  at  reasonable  prices  contributed  to  making  local  industry  a  little  more
competitive. Collaborations with innovative industries were experimented with, in the
field of  hydrogen for example.  One should also consider that this sector allowed the
realisation of road infrastructures in mountain valleys. 
14 For public authorities, the electricity sector represents an important source of revenue.
The water tax that the concessionary has to pay the canton in return for exploiting a
water course can reach 50 euros (80 CHF) per KW installed. It is defined by the Federal
parliament on the basis of a compromise between mountain cantons, lowland cantons
and electricity companies. 
 
On the environment 
15 The impacts on landscapes and watercourses of hydroelectric exploitation, that are often
overlooked,  have given rise to numerous protests.  The historian R.  Ceschi  recalls  for
example the reflections of A. Gnesa, an inhabitant of Val Verzasca, who compared "the
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material  benefit  measured  in  kilowatts  to  the  spiritual  well  being  dispensed  by  the
natural untouched beauty of the valley" (cf. Giannoni et Jakob, p. 31). She opposed a damn
that was activated in 1967.  Paradoxically,  Anna Gnesa suggested resorting to nuclear
energy in order to protect the mountain’s valleys. 
16 Significant damage was provoked on the Brenno River during the drainage of Luzzone in
1985: 250 000 m3 of mud was dumped and the river’s turbidity reached very high levels.
However,  it  is  the  question  of  residual  water  flows  that  caused  the  strongest
controversies. For a long time, the law did not foresee specific norms in this respect. The
federal act on the water protection of the 24th January 1991 filled a gap without however,
changing the situation; it can not be applied retrospectively due to vested rights. If it
were applied, electricity production for the canton could reduce by approximately 10%. 
17 The cantonal act on water use was completed by an article concerning residual flows in
1976. The problem of vested rights posed itself again here. As for water concessions, the
act has no precise rules in this respect. Negotiations with electricity companies lead to
numerous improvements as of the 1960s. 
18 The history of hydroelectricity is marked by a number of very serious accidents. For
example, the 9th October 1963, a landslide in the Vajont dam in the North of Italy caused
a  huge  wave  that  destroyed  several  villages,  causing  2’000  deaths.  The  echo  of  this
tragedy in a canton that had just constructed huge damns, where a considerable number
of immigrants from that very same region of  Italy worked,  was enormous.  The local
papers from the 11th and 12th October 1963 described "the thousands that disappeared
under a sea of mud and gravel" and stating that "grave responsibilities were emerging".
However,  this  type  of  risk,  supervised by  the  federal  services  through an ordinance
adopted in 1957, never really concerned the population. 
 
The succession of concession modes from 1905:
between cantonal, national and international
strategies 
Early 20th century: the concession of Biaschina 
19 The first significant concession dates back to 1905 and concerns the waters of Biaschina
(30 MW). It was granted to Motor of Baden, a private company, represented by A. Nizzola,
who played a fundamental role in the development of the Swiss electricity industry. A few
years later, Motor became Motor Columbus and created OFELTI to manage its interests in
Ticino; they later gave rise to ATEL in 1933. Other smaller concessions were granted to
towns and villages and to private companies. 
20 The idea of water cantonalisation incited great hope. Cantonal MP G. Cattori stated that
"the  public  ownership  would  allow  the  enriching  of  balance  sheets,  economic
development and stimulate industrialisation" (Ticino Parliament minutes (PM), Spring
1904, 
21 p. 354). It did not materialise as towns, villages and privately owned companies were
already organising the electricity distribution service, and Motor offered an industrial
project combining the exploitation of Biaschina’s waters with the creation of a small
indus-trial centre in Bodio. Furthermore, during the war, the industries of this village of
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Levantine worked for  the Germans,  to the extent  that  London’s  secret  services  were
monitoring their activities. 
22 The concession of Biaschina prohibited the exportation of electric current outside the
canton.  In  the  case  of  the  concessions  granted  to  the  Swiss  Railways,  it  was  even
requested that  the electricity production be used solely on the Ticino section of  the
Gothard line, "including the Airolo-Göschenen tunnel", that links Ticino to the German
part Switzerland (PM, Spring 1906, p. 713). 
23 It can be said that at the beginning of the 20th century, concessions were granted taking
into consideration the perspective of the canton’s economic development. Regarding the
environment, in the case of the debate on demand for the Biaschina concession, it was
noted that "electrochemical industries could produce negative exhalaisions and waste"
(PM, July 1905, p. 636). Furthermore, a terrible explosion provoked the destruction of the
Nitrum factory in Bodio on the 21st July 1921; 16 workers lost their lives. 
Between the two wars: the Piottino concession 
24 The second big concession concerns the waters of Piottino (45 MW), that were granted to
OFELTI in 1928 for a 40 year period. In 1933, when the installation was brought into
service, the concessionary was on the brink of bankruptcy. After the First World War, the
crisis  had  in  effect  hit  the  canton’s  economy.  Exportations  to  Italy  were  unable  to
develop, due to the creation of new production facilities in this country and restrictions
imposed by Rome.  Exportations in the North of  the Alps were made possible by the
realisation of the Gothard high tension line in 1933,  without however experiencing a
significant  expansion,  due  to  the  market’s  saturation.  Political  authorities  no  longer
objected to exportations, such that a message from cantonal government on the 20th
February  1933  states  that  "energy  exchanges  over  large  distances  have  become  a
fundamental condition for prosperity" (PM, Autumn 1933, p. 391). 
25 Economic perspectives did not make partisans of cantonalisation convincing during the
granting  of  the  concession.  Furthermore,  "hidden  powers"  must  have  presented  an
obstacle to the public ownership option, in fact cantonal government stated that "when
things were well on their way [with Italian investors], contracts were ruptured because of
influences that cannot be detailed" (PM, Spring 1927, p. 43). 
26 Piottino  did  not  lead  to  the  creation  of  new  industries.  This  represented  a  failure,
evermore so given that the market did not offer new prospects for production. Motor
Columbus,  in  allowing  OFELTI  to  realise  the  Piottino  development,  in  building  the
Gothard line and creating ATEL, was able to see beyond the period’s economic difficulties.
27 At  the  time,  environmental  problems  were  not  given  much  consideration.  The  first
Piottino concession project had a number of unique elements to it. It was anticipated that
"concessionaries must respect a residual water flow of 200 liters/second even during dry
times". If, however, new industries were created, measures should have been adopted "in
order to avoid the pollution of agriculture and of landscapes" (PM, Spring 1927, p. 10). 
 
The war years: the Lucendro concession 
28 In 1942, a third large concession was granted to ATEL: concerning the waters of Lucendro
and Sella, allowing the creation of a power plant of 45 MW, equipped with two artificial
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lakes.  The  economic  revival,  provoked  by  the  start  of  the  Second  World  War,  had
stimulated electricity demand. During the cold and dry winters, national supply was no
longer guaranteed. The concession was granted with very little discussion, due to the war
economy and the projects  characteristics,  that  experts  had qualified as  "inspired yet
costly". 
 
Immediately after the war: the Maggia and Blenio concessions 
29 In March 1949, Parliament approved the Maggia concession (570 MW), and in November
1953,  that  of  Blenio  (396  MW),  to  two  companies,  OFIMA  and  OFIBLE,  that  brought
together Ticino canton, ATEL and electricity companies belonging to cantons and towns
of the German part of Switzerland. In 1949, MPs from all parties, including the communist
opposition, congratulated themselves along with the cantonal government, notably N.
Celio,  who  became  president  of  the  Confederation,  on  the  skill  with  which  they
negotiated  the  Maggia  concession.  Cantonal  MP  E.  Zeli,  stated  that  "Today’s  vote
represents an exceptional part of our canton’s history and most importantly after the
opening  of  the  Gothard  railway"  (PM,  Autumn  1948,  p.  408).  In  1953,  the  Blenio
concession was approved with a little less enthusiasm, yet without real opposition. 
30 Criticism did not however delay to appear, with the publication in 1956 of a pamphlet by
F. Pedrini, ex cantonal MP and federal judge. It was characteristic of the political debate
that followed for the next thirty years, and rested on the following points: 
- The duration of the concession, 80 years, without a repurchase option: which would
have  allowed  the  renegotiation  of  concessions  after  40  years,  but  the  necessity  to
amortise several millions of francs did not facilitate the acceptance of such causes by
partners. 
-  The canton’s participation limited to 20% of the share capital:  however,  it  must be
recognised  that  it  was  difficult  for  the  canton  to  find  outlets  even  for  this  quota;
furthermore,  this  solution  allowed  to  share  out  the  risk  of  the  investment,  whilst
profiling the canton as an electricity producer. 
- The system of taxation of OFIMA and OFIBLE: in principle, these companies did not make
any profits, given that production is obtained at cost price. In order to avoid total escape
from  the  canton’s  tax  department,  they  are  made  to  declare  an  artificial  profit,
determined by the market’s interest rate applied to the share capital.  This offers the
advantage of guaranteeing the canton tax revenue, but the disadvantage of not reflecting
the true market value of the energy produced, hence objections. 
- The absence of rules forcing the companies to create industries in the region: on this
point it should be noted that the production of Maggia and Blenio is predominantly peak
energy, and does not lend itself to metallurgic or electrochemical supply, that requires
base-load energy. 
- The absence of standards on residual water flows, of which the effects were described
most powerfully by the writer P. Martini, an inhabitant of the Maggia Valley: "When a
little water runs beneath the bridge of Visletto – he wrote in 1957 – it sounds like a cow
urinating right along a course" (Giannoni et Jakob, p. 41). 
31 In order to understand the period’s hydroelectric policy, it is useful to recall that in the
immediacy after the war, the national market was faced with a shortage of electricity, but
it was difficult to know how things were to evolve through time. The Italian market could
not represent an outlet to installations created in Switzerland, as this country found itself
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in a precarious situation. In Ticino, existing installations were meeting cantonal demand.
Furthermore, the Swiss electricity sector had consolidated itself and was not open to new
entries, such as the Ticino canton. 
32 We can say that in this context, the canton attempted to take advantage of the necessity
to create large power stations in Switzerland in order to valorise Ticino’s hydroelectricity
potential. The Maggia and Blenio investments were conceived in view of exportation to
the German part of Switzerland. The resentment of the valleys’ inhabitants that followed,
can be understood notably in the fact that on the contrary to the cases of Biaschina and
Piottino, where populations had already been opened up by the creation of the Gothard
railway line in the 19th century, the populations of Maggia and Blenio had never been
faced with infrastructures of national scope (fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1. Main hydroelectric power plants and medium and high tension lines, Ticino, 2000. 
 
The 1950’s: the creation of a cantonal company 
33 The Biaschina concession incorporated a repurchase option after 40 years. It reached its
term in 1951. The canton was in a position to lay the foundations to water
cantonalisation. In this perspective, a cantonal electricity company had to be created. The
question  gave  rise  to  the  century’s  most  heated  political  debates.  Supporters  were
inspired  by  political  movement in  several  European  countries,  which  lead  to  the
nationalisation of the electricity sector in the immediate after war period (Bolchini et
Castronovo,  1989),  demanding  the  pure  and  simple  cantonalisation  of  the  Biaschina
waters. The cantonal government on the other hand defended a less radical approach and
sought  a  partnership  with  the  ex  concessionary  (ATEL).  The  canton’s  Parliamentary
special commission stigmatised the fact that "the message [from the government] was
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characterized by a pessimistic vision of the situation", and "is reticent with regards to the
advantages of the public ownership of the waters" (PM, Autumn 1958, p. 223). Airolo and
Lugano’s councils attempted to block the cantonalisation project because they favored
relations  with  ATEL.  Parliament  approved  the  repurchase  of  Biaschina  on  the  23rd
December 1958; the law establishing the canton’s company (AET) was approved in June
that same year. 
34 The repurchase of Biaschina brought to light an underlying political divide between those
who  thought  that  the  only  way  the  canton  could  prosper  was  through  water
cantonalisation, and those who, on the other hand thought that a partnership with ATEL
would  have  given them greater  hope.  The  future  brought  to  light  the  opportunities
presented to the canton by AET, and at the same time the difficulties of operating in a
market dominated by the incumbents. 
 
From the beginning of the 1960’s to the end of the 1990’s: the
development of the Cantonal Company 
35 With the economy as it was in the 1960’s, the canton found itself confronted by a strong
increase in electricity demand (fig. 2). The AET’s availability, having the responsibility of
the canton’s supply, can be resumed as follows: 
- The Biaschina and Piottino facilities, cantonalised respectively in 1958 and 1972 (with a
total of 195 MW including the modernisation of Biaschina); 
- the Verzasca facility, realised by AET and Lugano through to a concession granted 1959
(105 MW); 
- other minor hydroelectric facilities (23 MW); 
- the canton’s share of Maggia and Blenio production, from the 1980’s onwards, when
cession contracts between the canton and it’s partners expired (193 MW); 
- the nuclear power stations of Bugey, Cattenom and Leibstadt’s participation, acquired
between 1972 and 1985 despite antinuclear opposition (in total 45 MW); 
- a contract with ATEL as from 1988 (60 MW). 
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Figure 2. Electricity generation and consumption, Ticino, 1910-2006. 
36 It  should  be  noted  that  in  1988  the  cantonal  parliament  chose  not  to  act  upon the
repurchase option for Lucendro, because of the legal difficulties caused by the fact that
part of the waters depended upon the canton of Uri. 
37 AET experienced serious difficulties during this period, particularly between the 1960’s
and 1970’s, which lead to very poor financial results. In effect, it was obliged to dispose of
its surpluses and cover deficits on markets controlled by ATEL and EGL. F. Zorzi, member
of the cantonal government, resumed the problem as follows: "he who owns the network
is practically the master of he who doesn’t find himself in this situation and is obliged to
accept the conditions that are imposed on him" (PM, Spring 1960, p. 415). 
38 The  cantonal  company’s  mediocre  results  were  also  due  to  relatively  low  tariffs,
conceived to favor the local economy. The consequences were deceiving however, to the
extent that the large metallurgic factory Monteforno, situated near Bodio, which had
benefited from AET’s assistance, closed its doors in 1994. 
39 These  problems  caused  turbulent  political  debates,  which  were  not  only  looking  to
determine responsibility, but were also used as ammunition for both right and left wing
factions. 
 
The cantonal company facing the opening of markets
to competition and its future 
From 1998: the opening of markets 
40 Over the years, AET became a very important company for the canton. As the opening of
markets to competition took shape, a new generation of manager rose to the challenge by
attempting to take advantage of the opportunities that it brought, notably in playing a
much more active role on Swiss and European markets.  Profits rose in an impressive
manner. The company’s strategy became the maintenance of a decision making body of
great importance in the canton, the creation of a competence magnet in commercial
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matters, the assurance of supply security, the valorisation of hydroelectric resources and
the search for synergies with innovative industries. 
41 A certain opposition to the new AET’s management organised itself however. Many are
wary of privatisation, even though no plans were made on this subject. Confrontations
between  different  political  factions  had  repercussions  on  the  cantonal  company.
Management resisted, whilst following political debates closely.  Conflicts between the
canton and towns and villages reemerged. Airolo attempted to create alliances with other
villages in order to prevent the canton from repurchasing the Calcaccia waters (3,7 MW),
for which the concession was reaching expiration. Lugano’s electricity company, on the
other hand, bought shares in Motor Columbus, which controlled ATEL, and joined a group
comprising notably Electricité de France. This decision contrasted AET’s strategy that
focused on independence. 
42 The needs to dispose of a more abundant production lead AET to engage in the following
operations: 
- Expansion of the Biaschina facility (50 MW); 
- purchase of shares in the hydroelectric facility of Mattmark in Valais (20 MW); 
- participation in different types of installations (small hydroelectric and other renewable
energies, gas turbines, coal stations, possible nuclear power stations) in the European
Union. 
43 In order to take advantage of the development of green energy markets, AET joined the
"Naturmade"  association  and  the  European  organisation  "RECS"  (Renouvable  Energy
Certicates). With Rätia Energie (Val Poschiavo), it created Swisshydro for the marketing
of hydroelectric production on ecological grounds. 
 
The medium and long term future 
44 The reorganisation of electricity markets, which has just been ratified by the federal act
on electricity supply of the 23rd March 2007, is in the process of radically modifying the
problem of valorising hydroelectric resources. The prospect of accessing networks and
wholesale markets offers new perspectives to small and medium producers. AET seized
the opportunity and is evolving in this environment without underestimating the risks,
notably  those  related  to  the  uncompetitive  behaviors  of  big  Swiss  and  European
electricity companies. In the perspective of increasing tensions on energy markets, AET
must furthermore optimise its purchases and sales of electricity. 
45 The canton must prepare for the end of large hydroelectric concessions. One must not
lose  sight  of  the  amplitude  of  the  phenomenon:  between  2030  and  2060,  it  could
repurchase  approximately  1  100  MW.  Between  all  the  mountainous  cantons,
approximately 6 500 MW will reach expiration. In this perspective, these cantons should
examine  any  opportunities  for  convergences  allowing  the  creation  of  a  large  alpine
hydroelectricity company in the 2050 horizon. 
 
Conclusion 
46 The study of the experience of Ticino allows us to identify the critical factors that should
be  taken  into  consideration  when  defining  regional  policies  on  hydroelectricity  in
mountain regions. In order to valorise hydroelectric potential, there must first be great
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political will. Internecine quarrels between political factions are counterproductive, as
are rivalries between cantons, towns and villages and between mountain cantons. 
47 There must equally be great will and competence on behalf of the electricity sector’s
management,  which  must  know  to  strike  national  and  international  relations  and
correctly manage risks related to investments and trade. 
48 The  opening  of  electricity  markets  to  competition  can  represent  an  interesting
opportunity  to  valorise  regional  hydroelectric  resources,  through  the  possibility  of
accessing networks and wholesale markets. The monopolistic system did not offer this
opportunity. The creation of green products represents an asset,  in the measure that
environmental management rules are developed. 
49 Electricity companies should belong to a region’s local authority, in order to avoid the
relocation of decision centers. This does not prevent minority private share holdings or
collaborations  with  external  electricity  groups  that  are  respectful  of  their  partner’s
independence. 
50 Mountain  regions  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  importance  of  hydraulic  production  in
electricity  supply  security.  The  power  provided  by  power  plants  with  reservoirs  is
particularly precious in this respect. The perspectives for hydroelectricity are excellent
and producing regions must take advantage. 
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APPENDIXES
Abréviations 
AET : Azienda Elettrica Ticinese 
ATEL: Aare-Tessin AG für Elektrizität 
EGL : Elektrizitätsgesellschaft Laufenburg 
OFELTI : Officine Elettriche Ticinesi 
OFIBLE : Officine Idroelettriche della Blenio 
OFIMA : Officine Idroelettriche della Maggia 
PMTicino canton parlementary minutes 
ABSTRACTS
This  article  brings to light  the different models  applied in the management of  hydroelectric
resources in the Swiss canton Ticino during the 20th century. Future prospects are broached in
view  of  the  opening  of  the  electricity  markets  to  competition.  We  equally  analyse  political
projects, notably regarding matters of water cantonalisation, as well as the technico-economic
factors which influence them. Conflicts, that have been particularly acute, are evoked, and socio-
economic, energy and environmental issues detailed. The national and international context is
pointed out. The study allows the identification of critical factors that must be considered in the
definition of regional policies in relation to hydroelectric matters. 
Cet  article  met en lumière les  différents  modèles  de gestion des ressources hydroélectriques
adoptés dans le canton du Tessin au XXe siècle. Les perspectives d’avenir sont esquissées en vue
des  processus  d’ouverture  des  marchés  à  la  concurrence.  On  analyse  aussi  bien  les  projets
politiques,  notamment  en  matière  de  cantonalisation  des  eaux,  que  les  problèmes  technico-
économiques qui les ont influencés. Les conflits, qui ont été particulièrement aigus, sont évoqués,
et  les  enjeux  socio-économiques,  énergétiques  et  environnementaux  précisés.  Le  contexte
national et international est rappelé tout au long de l’analyse. Cette étude permet d’identifier les
facteurs critiques qu’il faut prendre en considération dans la définition des politiques régionales
en matière hydroélectrique.
INDEX
Mots-clés: hydroélectrique, concession d’eau, ouverture à la concurrence, politique régionale
Keywords: hydroelectricity, water concessions, opening to competition, regional policy
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